

M.1.0 APPENDIX M - FORCE/STRIKE PLANNING SCENARIO**Area Orientation Message for ITP-6**

EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE ITP6.AOM
P 07XXXXZ OCT 97
FM USCINCENT MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ2-J//
TO COMCARAIRWING SEVEN
AIG 7860
AIG 7827
INFO USCINCENT MACDILL AFB FL//SUPR//
BT
MSGID/GENADMIN/CCJ2-JIA//
OPER/INTEGRATED TRAINING PHASE-6(U)//
SUBJ/AREA ORIENTATION MESSAGE ITP-6 - AOM 006-97 (U)//
REF/A/RMG/USNAVSTKAIRWARCEN/01XXXXZOCT97//
AMPN/SPINS, ACO, ROE FOR OPERATION INTEGRATED TRAINING PHASE
(U)//
REF/B/RMG/USNAVSTKAIRWARCEN/07XXXXZOCT97//
AMPN/OPERATION INTEGRATED TRAINING PHASE OORDER (U)//
REF/C/RMG/USNAVSTKAIRWARCEN/07XXXXZOCT97//
AMPN/ITP-6 ANNEX 3B (TARGETS) (U)//
REF/D/RMG/USNAVSTKAIRWARCEN/07XXXXZOCT97//
AMPN/ITP-6 AIMPOINT GUIDANCE (U)//
RMKS/1. (U) ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE: THIS MESSAGE IS DESIGNED TO
PROVIDE CURRENT MILITARY AND GEOPOLITICAL BASELINE INTELLIGENCE
ON ORANGE. THIS INFORMATION IS CURRENT AS OF 01 OCT 97.
2. (U) CONTENTS:
- (U) SUMMARY (PARA 3)
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3. (U) SUMMARY:

A. (U) ORANGE OCCUPIES A STRATEGICALLY SENSITIVE AREA. THE CHARACTER OF ORANGE'S GOVERNMENT AND IT'S ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AFFECTS NOT ONLY THE GULF REGION BUT THE ENTIRE MIDDLE EAST.

B. (U) IN THE PAST FEW MONTHS ORANGE HAS BEEN INCREASING IT'S ANTI-WESTERN RHETORIC AND CONSISTANTLY OPPOSES ANY U.S. INVOLVEMENT/PRESENCE IN THE REGION TO INVESTIGATE THE DEATHS OF THE VACATIONING JONES FAMILY IN JULY OF 1997. ORANGE HAS ALSO BEEN INCREASING ITS SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS, TO INCLUDE FUNDING, WEAPONS, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TRAINING FACILITIES WITHIN THE COUNTRY.

C. (U) RECENT INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION HAS REVEALED SHIPMENTS OF LOW-GRADE URANIUM HAVE BEEN RECIEVED BY ORANGE. LOCATION OF THE STORAGE FACILITY IS UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME. THE U.N. HAS REQUESTED THE PURPOSE FOR THE URANIUM, HOWEVER THE ORANGE GOVERNMENT PLEADS IGNORANCE ON THE POSSESSIONS OF THE URANIUM. FURTHER SOURCES INDICATE ORANGE HAS RESUMED PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND MAY BE ATTEMPTING TO DEVELOP WARHEADS CAPABLE OF DELIVERY BY SRBM'S. THE U.N. HAS, ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, DISCUSSED THE USE OF SANCTIONS OR LEGAL ACTIONS AGAINST ORANGE FOR IT'S ACTIVITIES.

4. (U) GEOPOLITICAL:

A. (U) ORANGE IS RULED BY AH'TIM ROKKI, THE LEADER OF THE FUNDAMENTALIST BUUD'WYZER PARTY, WHICH SEIZED POWER IN A 1962 COUP. ROKKI IS A DEVOUT ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST HARDLINER, WHO HOLDS THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, HEAD OF THE FUNDAMENTALIST COUNCIL, AND SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES. HE CONTROLS VIRTUALLY ALL ASPECTS OF ORANGE GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY.

5. (U) DEMOGRAPHICS:

A. (U) DEMOGRAPHICS. THE POPULATION OF ORANGE IS ESTIMATED TO BE 985,000 (APPROX 580,000 MEN, AND 405,000 WOMEN). THE NATIONAL RELIGION OF ORANGE IS ISLAM (75% SHII'A). CHRISTIANS COMPRISE ONLY 25% OF THE POPULACE. A MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION RESIDE IN THE MAJOR CITIES. THE REMAINDER ARE SPREAD THROUGHOUT RURAL AREAS OF THE COUNTRY AND DEPEND ON FARMING AS THEIR ONLY SOURCE OF INCOME. IT IS ESTIMATED APPROX 2,000 MEN (AGED 15-21) FLEE THE COUNTRY ANNUALLY TO ESCAPE THE MANDATORY 10 YEARS INDUCTION

IN THE MILITARY. WOMEN ARE FORCED TO MARRY BY THE AGE OF 16, AND ARE ALLOWED TO BEAR, 1 DAUGHTER AND 2 SONS BY LAW. IF THE WOMEN DO NOT HAVE THEIR CHILDREN BY THE AGE OF 21, THEY ARE CONSIDERED SOCIALLY OUTCASTS.

6. (U) GEOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE:

A. (U) TERRAIN: THE ENTIRE REGION IS CHARACTERIZED BY BROAD, MOSTLY FLAT BASINS DIVIDED BY LONG, NARROW, STEEP-SIDED MOUNTAIN RIDGES. THE RIDGES ARE MOSTLY ORIENTED NORTH-SOUTH AND RANGE IN WIDTH FROM A FEW KILOMETERS TO ABOUT 15 KILOMETERS (9 MILES). SLOPES ARE 30 DEGREES OR MORE, AND SURFACES ARE ROUGH AND ROCKY. SUMMITS REACH 1,800 TO 3,000 METERS (6,000-10,000 FT) ABOVE SEA LEVEL. BASINS BETWEEN THE MOUNTAIN RIDGES LIE AT ABOUT 1,500 METERS (5,000 FEET) ABOVE SEA LEVEL AND AVERAGE 15 KILOMETERS (9 MILES) IN WIDTH. BASIN FLOORS ARE FLAT -- MANY CONTAIN DRY LAKE BEDS -- WHILE THE MARGINS ARE BROKEN BY ROCKY, DRY STREAM BEDS. SLOPES ARE GENERALLY ABOUT 3 DEGREES, BUT ALONG DRAINAGE FEATURES THEY ARE LOCALLY STEEP TO VERTICAL.

B. (U) VEGETATION: VEGETATION CONSISTS OF VARIOUS LOW SHRUBS, CACTI, GRASSES AND WEEDS. DOMINANT VEGETATION INCLUDES CREOSOTE, BURRO BUSHES, YUCCA PLANTS AND VARIOUS WEEDS. TALL GRASSES COVER SALT MARSHES IN A FEW BASINS. JOSHUA TREES ARE SCATTERED IN SOME BASINS AND LOWER SLOPES. MOST VEGETATION IS TYPICALLY SMALL AND SPARSE ON THE DESERT FLOOR, BUT BECOMES LARGE AND MORE ABUNDANT ON THE SIDES OF RIDGES. PINION PINES BECOME COMMON ABOVE 1,800 METERS (6,000 FEET). NEAR THE HIGHER RIDGE TOPS, VEGETATION BECOMES SPARSE ONCE AGAIN.

C. (U) WATER: GENERALLY, WATER SOURCES IN MOST OF THE COUNTRY ARE SCARCE AND CANNOT SUPPORT LARGE MILITARY FORMATIONS FOR EXTENDED PERIODS OF TIME. DURING THE HOT, DRY SEASON (MAY THROUGH SEPT), WATER SOURCES ARE LIMITED TO SCATTERED WELLS IN THE BASINS AND ON THE LOWER MOUNTAIN SLOPES. SURFACE WATER SOURCES ARE SPARSE AND WIDELY SEPARATED. SMALL CATCH BASINS OF RAIN OR SNOW MELT WATER MAY BE FOUND IN ROCKY PLACES NOT EXPOSED TO DIRECT SUNLIGHT. SOME WATER MAY BE FOUND CLOSE TO THE SURFACE IN THE INTERIOR BENDS OF DRY STREAMBEDS. AT ELEVATIONS BETWEEN 1,200 AND 2,100 METERS (4,000 AND 7,000 FEET), THERE ARE OCCASIONAL NATURAL SPRINGS AND SPRING-FED STOCK WATERING TANKS. MANY MINOR SOURCES OF WATER EXIST ABOVE 2,100 METERS (7,000 FEET), CONSISTING OF SMALL SPRINGS AND STREAMS. ALL WATER SHOULD BE CONSIDERED NON-POTABLE AND TREATED BEFORE DRINKING.

D. (U) CLIMATE: THE CLIMATE OF THIS REGION IS CHARACTERISTIC OF A HIGH DESERT ENVIRONMENT, VARYING ACCORDING TO ELEVATION, SEASON, AND TIME OF DAY. AT ELEVATIONS UP TO 1,200 METERS (4,000 FEET), THE CLIMATE IS EXTREME AND SELDOM PLEASANT. DAYTIME TEMPERATURES ARE HOT TO EXTREMELY HOT FROM MAY THROUGH SEPT, WITH MEAN HIGHS OF 90 TO 100 DEGREES FAHRENHEIT IN JULY AND AUG AND EXTREMES AS HIGH AS 120 DEGREES FAHRENHEIT. THE TEMPERATURE FALLS QUICKLY AFTER SUNSET; NIGHTS ARE OFTEN COMFORTABLE AND MAY

BE CHILLY. THE DAY-TO-NIGHT TEMPERATURE CHANGE CAN BE AS MUCH AS 45 DEGREES FROM OCT THROUGH APRIL, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE OCCASIONAL WARMER PERIODS, WITH DAYS GENERALLY MILD TO CHILLY, AND NIGHTS ARE COLD. DURING THE COLDEST MONTHS, TEMPERATURES MAY FALL INTO THE TEENS IN THE SOUTH AND BELOW 0 DEGREES FAHRENHEIT IN THE NORTH. AT ELEVATIONS OF 1,200 TO 2,100 METERS (4,000 TO 7,000 FEET), TEMPERATURES ARE 30-40 DEGREES COOLER THAN IN THE LOWER ELEVATIONS, WITH 30 DEGREE DAY TO NIGHT VARIATIONS. PRECIPITATION IS EXTREMELY IRREGULAR, AND "AVERAGE" CONDITIONS HAVE LITTLE SIGNIFICANCE. PRECIPITATION OCCURS MOSTLY IN A FEW INTENSE, LOCALIZED SUMMER THUNDERSTORMS OR IN SHOWERS ACCOMPANYING WINTER FRONTAL PASSAGES. ANY MONTH IN A PARTICULAR YEAR MAY HAVE NO RAINFALL. ALTHOUGH BASIN LOCATIONS HAVE MEAN ANNUAL TOTALS OF LESS THAN 5 INCHES, HALF THAT MUCH MAY FALL IN A SINGLE STORM. MEAN ANNUAL PRECIPITATION AT HIGHER ELEVATIONS IS SLIGHTLY GREATER THAN IN THE BASINS, AND MOST OF IT OCCURS DURING THE COLDER MONTHS. SNOWFALL AT THE HIGHER ELEVATIONS AVERAGES ABOUT 12 INCHES PER YEAR IN THE SOUTH AND CAN BE AS MUCH AS SEVERAL FEET NEAR THE WESTERNMOST BORDER. MUCH OF THE NORTH IS BLANKETED WITH A THIN COVER OF SNOW FROM DEC THROUGH FEB. OCCASIONAL SUMMER THUNDERSTORMS PRODUCE LARGE AMOUNTS OF RAIN IN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME, OFTEN RESULTING IN FLASH FLOODS. THUNDERSTORMS OFTEN ARE ACCOMPANIED BY CONSIDERABLE LIGHTNING AND VIOLENT WINDS IN EXCESS OF 40 MILES PER HOUR, CREATING UNSAFE CONDITIONS.

7. (U) TRANSPORTATION:

A. (U) TRANSPORTATION: THE REGION CONTAINS A FEW, WIDELY SEPARATED HARD-SURFACE THROUGH-ROUTES, WHICH CARRY LIGHT TO MODERATE TRAFFIC. IMPROVED AND UNIMPROVED EARTH SURFACE ROADS ARE SCATTERED ACROSS THE REGION, SERVING MILITARY TRAINING EXERCISES AND LOCAL CIVILIAN ACTIVITIES, SUCH AS FARMING. THESE ROADS ARE SUPPLEMENTED BY NUMEROUS 4X4 TRACKS. TRAFFIC IS SPARSE ON THE EARTH-SURFACE ROADS AND TRACKS. HARD-SURFACE ROADS GENERALLY FOLLOW STRAIGHT ALIGNMENTS ACROSS THE BASINS AND THREAD THROUGH GAPS IN THE RIDGES. EARTH-SURFACE ROADS CROSS BASINS AND EXTEND ONTO THE LOWER SLOPES OF MOUNTAINS, WHILE 4X4 TRACKS CAN BE FOUND IN ALL BUT THE STEEPEST TERRAIN.

8. (U) MILITARY CAPABILITIES:

A. (U) MILITARY CAPABILITIES. ORANGE POSSESSES ONE OF THE LARGEST MILITARIES IN THE REGION. HOWEVER, THE NUMBER OF CONFLICTS WITH NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES OVER THE PAST DECADE HAS SEVERELY DEGRADED IT'S MILITARY CAPABILITIES. DRASTIC MEASURES HAVE TAKEN PLACE TO CORRECT DEFICIENCIES HIGHLIGHTED DURING PRIOR CONFLICTS, INCLUDING REMOVING MANY HIGH LEVEL MILITARY OFFICIALS AND ADVISORS FROM THEIR POSTS AND PUNISHED SEVERELY, BOTH BY IMPRISONMENT AND EXECUTION. MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES STILL EXIST AND NEW ACQUISITION PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN EFFECTED BY LACK OF FUNDS.

9. (U) AIR DEFENSE, EARLY WARNING AND WEAPONS SYSTEMS:

A. (U) AIR DEFENSE: AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF, THE PRESIDENT HAS SUPREME AUTHORITY OVER ALL MILITARY FORCES. HE HOLDS RESPONSIBILITY FOR MOST MAJOR POLICY DECISIONS ALTHOUGH HE RELIES ON AN INNER CIRCLE OF MILITARY ADVISORS. THE DEFENSE MINISTER (DM) ACTS AS POLITICAL COORDINATOR BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE COMMANDER OF THE AIR AND AIR DEFENSE FORCES (CAADF). IN THE PAST, THE PRESIDENT HAS EXERCISED SOME HANDS ON CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY'S AIR DEFENSE BUT RECENTLY HAS RELIED MORE HEAVILY ON THE CAADF FOR OPERATIONAL DECISIONS AND CENTRALIZED CONTROL. DAILY DECISION MAKING HAS BEEN DELEGATED FURTHER TO THE DEPUTY COMMANDERS OF THE AIR FORCE (AF) AND THE AIR DEFENSE FORCE (ADF). INVOLVEMENT OF THE CAADF, DM, AND EVEN THE PRESIDENT IN DECISION MAKING CANNOT BE OVERLOOKED, ESPECIALLY CONCERNING SENSITIVE ISSUES. DAILY COMMAND AND CONTROL FUNCTIONS ON THE NATIONAL LEVEL ARE CONDUCTED FROM THE NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS CENTER (ADOC) LOCATED IN FALLONAZI (392850N/1184530W). THIS BUNKERED UNDERGROUND FACILITY IS LINKED TO THE AF AND ADF HEADQUARTERS, AND PRESIDENTIAL PALACE BY TUNNELS. IT IS WITHIN THE ADOC THAT THE CAADF AND HIS DEPUTY COMMANDERS MONITOR THE NATIONAL AIR SITUATION, MILITARY OPERATIONS, AND RELAY ORDERS. ORANGE IS SUBDIVIDED INTO 2 AIR DEFENSE SECTORS, EACH COMMANDED BY THE NEXT SUBORDINATE AF AND ADF COMMANDER. THE NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN ZONE DEMARCATION LINE IS BELIEVED TO BE ROUGHLY DIAGONAL LINE RUNNING FROM 3900N/11930W NORTHEAST TO 3930N/11800W AND CONTINUING NORTHEAST TO THE COAST LINE. THE PRIMARY COMMAND AND CONTROL NODE OF EACH SECTOR IS THE SECTOR OPERATIONS SECTOR (SOC). THE NORTHERN DEFENSE ZONE SOC IS LOC AT FALLONAZI (392850N/1184530W), WHILE THE SOUTHERN AIR DEFENSE ZONE SOC IS LOC NEAR THE BLOW SAND MOUNTAINS (391030N/1183800W). THE SOC IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OVERALL AIR DEFENSE OF ITS SPECIFIC GEOGRAPHIC REGION. THE ADOC DOES NOT APPEAR TO DIRECTLY CONTROL SECTOR OPERATIONS EXCEPT FOR ASSIGNING AIR DEFENSE PRIORITIES. RESPONSIBILITY FOR EACH AIR DEFENSE SECTOR IS FURTHER DIVIDED INTO TWO INTERCEPT OPERATIONS CENTERS (IOC) WHICH REPORT DIRECTLY TO THE SOC. A NETWORK OF EW RADAR REPORTING POSTS (RP) AND VISUAL OBSERVER POSTS (VOP) REPORT DIRECTLY TO THE IOC. AT LEAST 2 RP'S AND 4 VOP'S PER IOC. ALL POTENTIAL TARGETS AND THE FOLLOWING THREAT DATA ARE CONTAINED WITHIN EASTERN AND WESTERN AIR DEFENSE SECTOR IOC'S. THE SOC'S SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITIES INCLUDE:

- COMPILATION OF THE AIR SITUATION FOR THE SECTOR WHICH IS RELAYED TO THE ADOC.
- COORDINATION BETWEEN IOCS FOR TARGET TRACKING.
- ASSIGNMENT OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS TO SPECIFIC TRACKS.
- HANDOFF OF TARGET ASSIGNMENTS TO IOCS.

THE SOCS ARE DIVIDED INTO TWO SUBORDINATE IOC'S. THE NORTHERN SECTOR IOC BOUNDARY IS DEDUCED TO RUN FROM SOUTH OF FALLONAZI (3919N/11845W) TO LOVELOCK AND CONTINUE TO THE NORTHERN ORANGE BORDER ALONG THE SAME BEARING. THE EASTERN IOC IS UNLOCATED BUT SUSPECTED TO BE IN A COMPLEX NEAR B-20 (395230N/1182020W), WHILE THE WESTERN IOC IS SITUATED NEAR (393400N/1190030W). THE SOUTHERN SECTOR IOC BOUNDARY RUNS FROM 3919N/11845W TO 3830N/11815W. THE SOUTHERN SECTOR, EASTERN IOC IS LOCATED IN THE B-17 MILITARY COMPLEX (391421N/1181411W), WITH THE WESTERN IOC LOCATED IN THE VICINITY OF SHURZ (385600N/1184800W). SOCS AND IOCS ARE IN UNDERGROUND BUNKERED FACILITIES. STANDARD ORANGE BUNKER CONSTRUCTION IS 6 FT. REINFORCED CONCRETE WALLS WITH APPROX 15 FT. OF OVERBURDEN. THE IOCS FUNCTION INCLUDE:

-DEVELOP THE AIR SITUATION PICTURE FOR ITS GEOGRAPHIC AREA BASED ON RADAR INPUTS FROM THE RPS.

-MANUALLY CORRELATE DATA/VOICE REPORTS FROM VOPS AND DECONFLICT KNOWN ORANGE AIRCRAFT.

-IDENTIFY TRACKS USING A VARIETY OF METHODS. IFF REMAINS THE PRIMARY MEANS OF IDENTIFICATION.

-PERFORM GCI FOR FIGHTERS, AND DESIGNATE TARGETS FOR SAMS AS DIRECTED BY THE SOC.

RPS CONSIST OF ONE OR MORE EW RADARS WHOSE TRACKS ARE FORWARDED UP-ECHELON TO THE IOC FOR EVALUATION. VISUAL OBSERVATION POSTS AUGMENT THE AIR SURVEILLANCE NETWORK. SOME VOP'S MAY BE AUGMENTED BY EO/AUDIO DEVICES. THEIR RESPONSIBILITY IS TO PASS VIA LANDLINE OR RADIO TO THE IOC ANY DETECTIONS OF HOSTILE OR UNKNOWN AIRCRAFT. RECENT ASSESSMENTS REVEAL ORANGE IS DEVELOPING A UHF COMM JAMMING CAPABILITY. LIMITED FREQUENCY JAMMING HAS BEEN OBSERVED DURING LOCAL ADF TRAINING EXERCISES.

IMAGERY OF ARMY COMPOUNDS AND DEPLOYED VEHICLES SHOW ORANGE IS NOW APPLYING SOME CAMOUFLAGE, CONCEALMENT AND DECEPTION (CC&D) TECHNIQUES. PRIMARY METHODS TO DATE HAVE BEEN LIMITED TO DUMMY EW/SAM SITES AND NON RADAR ABSORBABLE CAMOUFLAGE NETTING.

B. (U) EW/GCI. ORANGE HAS SUBSTANTIAL INVENTORIES OF EQUIPMENT SO IT CAN REPLACE OR REPAIR DESTROYED OR INOPERATIVE EQUIPMENT VERY QUICKLY.

EW/GCI:

| SITE | THREAT | LOCATION | BE# |
|------|--|------------------|------------|
| 32 | BAR LOCK/ SIDENET | 391331N/1182137W | 0017-01001 |
| 70 | LONG TRACK/ THIN SKIN/ FLAT FACE | 393442N/1180756W | 0017-00996 |

| | | | |
|----|----------------------------|------------------|------------|
| 10 | SPOON REST A/ THIN SKIN | 391846N/1181201W | 0017-01002 |
| 16 | LONG TRACK | 391757N/1181141W | 0017-00916 |
| 35 | FLAT FACE | 390448N/1180957W | 0017-00135 |
| 38 | FLAT FACE | 395306N/1182400W | 0017-90038 |
| 02 | THIN SKIN LONGTRACK | 391755N/1181821W | 0017-90002 |
| 09 | TALL KING | 391923N/1181328W | 0017-90009 |

C. (U) SAMS. ORANGE TYPICALLY EMPLOYS ITS MISSILE SYSTEMS FROM FIXED LOCATIONS. EVEN MOBILE SAMS (SA-6/SA-8) HAVE BEEN SUBORDINATED TO ADF COMMAND FROM THE ARMY AND PLACED IN TACTICAL SURVEYED SITES. IN THE EVENT OF A PROLONGED CAMPAIGN, IT IS EXPECTED THAT THESE MOBILE SYSTEMS WILL SHIFT BACK TO ARMY CONTROL FOR PROTECTION OF TROOPS AND CRITICAL ARMY INTERESTS. NEARLY ALL SAMS ARE LINKED TOGETHER AND TO THE IOC BY LANDLINE. IT IS VIA THESE LANDLINES THAT IOCS PASS CUING INFORMATION, ENGAGEMENT ORDERS AND ATTEMPT TO DECONFLICT ORANGE INTERCEPTORS. ORANGE HAS EXPERIENCED ARM ATTACKS AND RUDIMENTARY COUNTER ARM TACTICS HAVE BEEN OBSERVED. IT IS MORE LIKELY THAT THE SITE WILL OPERATE AUTONOMOUSLY IN THE HOPE OF ACQUIRING ITS OWN CONTACTS WHEN CONNECTIVITY DEGRADES. LOCALLY HEAVY CONCENTRATIONS OF SHOULDER FIRED SAMS AND LIGHT AAA, CONSISTING OF SA-7/14/16 AND OPTICALLY DIRECTED 23MM AND 37MM AAA, WITH SOME 57MM AAA SHOULD BE ANTICIPATED ALONG LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND IN THE VICINITY OF HIGH MOUNTAIN PASSES CONSISTENT WITH OBSERVED GROUND FORCE TRAINING OPERATIONS.

SAMS:

| SITE | THREAT | LOCATION | BE# |
|------|----------|------------------|------------|
| 70 | SA-2 B/F | 393442N/1180756W | 0017-00270 |
| 9 | SA-2 B/F | 391923N/1181328W | 0017-00209 |
| 7 | SA-3 | 392143N/1180959W | 0017-00307 |
| 17 | SA-6 | 392224N/1181443W | 0017-00617 |
| | SA-6 | UNLOCATED | |
| 96 | SA-8 | 385530N/1175730W | 0017-00896 |
| | SA-8 | UNLOCATED | |
| | AAA/IR: | | |
| 4 | FIRECAN | 392055N/1181158W | 0017-00104 |

| | | | |
|-----|----------|------------------|------------|
| 5 | ZSU-23-4 | 391415N/1181632W | 0017-02305 |
| 18 | ZSU-23-4 | 390226N/1181816W | 0017-02318 |
| 98 | ZSU-23-4 | 393230N/1174500W | 0017-02398 |
| 99 | ZSU-23-4 | 392730N/1171330W | 0017-02399 |
| 100 | ZSU-23-4 | 390740N/1173730W | 0017-23100 |
| 101 | ZSU-23-4 | 390100N/1175859W | 0017-23101 |
| 102 | ZSU-23-4 | 391830N/1181200W | 0017-23102 |
| 103 | ZSU-23-4 | 385855N/1182030W | 0017-23103 |
| 104 | ZSU-23-4 | 385400N/1180000W | 0017-23104 |

*IR THREATS DEPLOYED WITH TROOPS IN TARGET AREA.

10. (U) AIR FORCES:

A. (U) AIR FORCE ASSETS. ORANGE AIR FORCE ASSETS ARE IN A HIGH STATE OF READINESS. STRIP ALERTS ARE MANNED NEARLY ROUND THE CLOCK AT THREAT AIRFIELDS. DLI OBSERVED CAPABILITY TO LAUNCH WITHIN 2+00 MINUTES. PHANTOMS AND F-51S HAVE BEEN OBSERVED ON STRIP ALERT AT FALLONAZI AFLD. FULCRUMS HAVE BEEN OBSERVED ON STRIP ALERT AT LONE ROCK AFLD. CURRENTLY JEDI AFLD (391404N/1181439W) IS ASSESSED TO BE ABANDONED. DEFENSIVE PATROLS ARE FREQUENTLY MANNED ALONG THE COASTLINE AND ALONG PERCEIVED AVENUES OF APPROACH TO BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN HIGH VALUE FACILITIES. HISTORICAL DEFPATS HAVE BEEN NOTED IN THE VICINITY OF COLD SPRINGS, MT AUGUSTA, LONEROCK, GABBS, AND EAST GATE. THE STANDARD FLIGHT COORIDORS USED BY THE ORANGE AIR FORCE ARE: LONE ROCK (FROM B-20 NE TO JERSEY VALLEY), AUGUSTA (FROM FALLONAZI NE TO DIXIE VALLEY), COLD SPRINGS (FROM GABBS NORTH TO EDWARDS CREEK VALLEY), RAWHIDE (FROM GABBS WEST TO SAND SPRINGS RANGE). SOC COMMANDERS HAVE USED FIGHTERS TO FILL GAPS IN SAM COVERAGE DUE TO FAILURE OR DAMAGE. ORANGE FIGHTERS USUALLY WORK IN SECTIONS BOTH DAY AND NIGHT EMPLOYING STANDARD SOVIET FORMATIONS. PILOTS USE GCI FOR CUEING/SA. IF JAMMING OR OTHER DEGRADATION OF THE GCI NET OCCURS, ORANGE FIGHTERS CAN BE EXPECTED TO WORK AUTONOMOUSLY WITH A VISUAL SEARCH AND RADAR SEARCH. IF ENCOUNTERED IN THE VISUAL ARENA, ORANGE FIGHTERS CAN BE EXPECTED TO BE AGGRESSIVE. TO DATE ORANGE F-51S HAVE NOT BEEN OBSERVED REACTING TO RWR. MIG-291S, F-41S & F-141S ARE RWR REACTIVE. FIGHTERS CAN BE EXPECTED TO FLY SPECIFIC RETURN TO FORCE PROFILES IN ORDER TO DECONFLICT WITH SAMS AND AAA WITHIN THE IADS. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT SOCS HAVE ESTABLISHED ENGAGEMENT ZONES FOR SAM ENGAGEMENTS IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE LOSSES TO FRIENDLY FIRE DURING PERIODS OF DEGRADATION. IFF REMAINS THE PRIMARY MEANS OF DECONFLICTION. HISTORICALLY, MIG-29'S WILL GO FEET WET BUT F-41S, F-51S, AND F-141S WILL ONLY GO FEET WET DURING HOT PURSUIT. F-141S HAVE BEEN USED AS AN AEW PLATFORM. ORANGE USES WESTERN IFF SYSTEMS AND IS CAPABLE OF INTERROGATING MODES I/II/III, AND C. WESTERN MILITARY AIRCRAFT SQUAWK ALL OF THESE MODES. AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN OBSERVED TO ROTATE

CODES IN LINE WITH U.S. FORCES OPERATING IN THE AREA, HOWEVER, THIS IS NOT UNIVERSAL. FSU AIRCRAFT ARE EQUIPPED WITH IFF, BUT NO INTERROGATIONS HAVE BEEN NOTED. RSNB WAS EXPORTED WITH THE FSU ACFT BUT IS NOT USED. ORANGE HAS BEEN NOTED USING THE FOLLOWING GCI FREQS: 233.75, 271.4, 266.8, 262.7, 281.2, 278.8, 265.8, 318.5, 238.1, 267.4, 321.85, AND 314.1.

WESTERN AND FSU AIRLINE AND TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT TRANSIT THE COUNTRY ON A DAILY BASIS. MOST FLIGHTS ARE WITH AN-12 AIRCRAFT AT MEDIUM ALTITUDE. THESE FLIGHTS MAINTAIN POSITIVE COMMUNICATIONS WITH ATC DUE TO RADAR AND IFF COVERAGE PROBLEMS AWAY FROM THE CAPITAL. FLIGHTS ORIGINATE FROM FALLONAZI AIRFIELD ONLY.

AIR/AIR:

| SITE | LOCATION | BE# |
|----------------|--------------------|------------|
| LONE ROCK AFLD | 395050N/1182030W | 0017-08006 |
| 12 MIG-29 | 2-4 ON STRIP ALERT | |
| FALLONAZI AFLD | 392501N/1184214W | 0017-08005 |
| 06 F-4 | 2-4 ON STRIP ALERT | |
| 06 F-5 | 2-4 ON STRIP ALERT | |
| 04 F-14A | 0-2 ON STRIP ALERT | |
| JEDI AFLD | 391404N/1171439W | 0017-08001 |

ASSESSED TO BE ABANDONED

*AIRFIELDS ARE HEAVILY DEFENDED BY LARGE CALIBER AAA AND IR SAMS.

| | | |
|-------------------|------------|-----------------------|
| OBSERVED LOADOUT: | MIG-29 A/C | 2 AA-10A/4 AA-11/GUN |
| | F-4 | 4 AIM-7E/4 AIM-9J/GUN |
| | F-5 | 2 AIM-9J |
| | F-14A | 2 AIM-7E/4 AIM-9J/GUN |

10.1 (U) COMMERCIAL AIR:

A. (U) COMMERCIAL AIR TRAFFIC. DAY AND NIGHT COMMERCIAL AIR TRAFFIC IS HEAVY WITHIN THE AREAS OF INTEREST. SEVERAL LARGE CIVILIAN AND JOINT CIVIL USE AIRFIELDS IN WESTERN ORANGE AND NEARBY FRIENDLY NATIONS FEED A NETWORK OF AIR ROUTES IN ORANGE. SPECIFIC INTEREST FOR DECONFLICTION ARE: J32, J95, J154, J158, J56, J84, J92 (REFERENCE U.S. GOVERNMENT FLIGHT INFORMATION PUBLICATION/ENROUTE HIGH ALTITUDE/H-1 AND H-2) AND V6, V32, V494, V105, V564, V230 (REFERENCE U.S. GOVERNMENT FLIGHT INFORMATION PUBLICATION/ENROUTE LOW ALTITUDE/L-5 AND L-7).

B. (U) VR AIR TRAFFIC IN AND AROUND THE COUNTRY OF ORANGE IS IMPACTED BY THE EXISTENCE OF 13 MUNICIPAL AIRFIELDS WITHIN 120NM

RADIUS OF FALLONAZI. AIRCRAFT HAVE CONFORMED TO ICAO PROCEDURES AND TYPICALLY SQUAWKED 1200 DURING VFR FLIGHTS.

C. THE GOVERNMENT HAS MANDATED THAT JET ROUTE TRAFFIC CONTINUE DURING TIMES OF CRISIS AND CONFLICT. THE REGIME BELIEVES THAT MAINTAINING NORMAL OPERATIONS SENDS A SIGNAL THAT THEY ARE IN CONTROL AND NOT EFFECTED BY EXTERNAL PRESSURES. JET LINERS CONTINUE TO ADHERE TO ICAO FLIGHT PROCEDURES AND SQUAWK INTERNATIONAL MODE III. DURING HEIGHTENED TENSIONS THEY EXHIBIT PROACTIVE RADIO COMMS TO IDENTIFY THEMSELVES WHEN CHALLENGED.

PASSENGER PARTICIPATION STILL DECREASED DRAMATICALLY DURING PAST PERIODS OF HEIGHTENED TENSIONS WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS. THIS PRACTICE HAS CAUSED ORANGE AIR CARRIERS TO INCUR SIGNIFICANT FINANCIAL LOSSES OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS.

11. (U) GROUND FORCES:

A. (U) MAJOR UNIT LOCATIONS. ORANGE'S ARMY HEADQUARTERS IS BASED IN THE FALLONAZI AREA BURIED IN RATTLESNAKE MOUNTAIN (393000N/1184200W). THE ORANGE GROUND FORCES ARE DIVIDED INTO 2 DIVISION (1ST AND 2ND DIVISIONS). THE 1ST DIVISION IS HEADQUARTERED AT FALLONAZI AFLD (392828N/1184639W) IN THE NORTHERN DEFENSE ZONE. THE 2ND DIVISION IS HEADQUARTERED AT GABBS AFLD (385520N/1175740W) IN THE SOUTHERN DEFENSE ZONE. TOTAL MANPOWER EQUALS 13,200 MEN.

B. (U) SUBORDINATION. THE 1ST DIVISION HAS FOUR SUBORDINATE BRIGADES (11TH INFANTRY, 12TH INFANTRY, 14TH MECHANIZED INFANTRY, AND THE 15TH INDEPENDENT ARTILLERY). THE 15TH IS USED FOR DEFENSE OF THE ARMY HQ'S AT RATTLESNAKE MTN, THE 1ST DIVISION HQ, THE ORANGE PRESIDENT AND IMPORTANT GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS. THE 2ND DIVISION HAS FIVE SUBORDINATE BRIGADES (21ST INFANTRY, 22ND INFANTRY, 23RD ARMOR, 24TH MECHANIZED INFANTRY, AND THE 25TH INDEPENDENT ARTILLERY). THE 25TH IS USED FOR DEFENSE OF THE 2ND DIVISION HQ AND OTHER IMPORTANT GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS.

C. (U) TACTICS AND DOCTRINES. THE ORANGE ARMY USES THE DOCTRINE AND TACTICS OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, MODIFIED TO SUIT THE LOCAL CONDITIONS.

D. (U) NVD CAPABILITY. RUDIMENTARY NIGHT VISION DEVICES ARE DEPLOYED DOWN TO THE BATTALION LEVEL AND ARE USED SOLELY BY THE LEADERSHIP.

E. (U) ORANGE AIR ASSAULT CAPABILITES. THE ORANGE ARMY HAS NO AIR ASSAULT CAPABILITY.

F. (U) AIR DEFENSE ASSETS ASSIGNED TO ORANGE ARMY UNITS NORMALLY DEPLOY WITH THE GROUND FORCES. ZSU-23/4'S DEPLOY ON A DAILY BASIS FOR TRAINING AND PROVIDE POINT DEFENSE TO GROUND FORCES ON THE MOVE. SOME AAA ASSETS, INCLUDING ZSU-23-4ís, PROVIDE POINT DEFENSE FOR MILITARY AND INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES.

G. (U) GROUND ORDER OF BATTLE IS AS FOLLOWS:

| | | |
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| ARMY HEADQUARTERS | 393000N/1184200W | |
| 1ST DIVISION (COMBINED) | 392828N/1184639W | 400 |
| 20 ATRL, JEEP MTD | | |
| 20 MG, SP, LAND CRUISER MTD | | |
| 11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE HQ | 392828N/1184639W | 200 |
| 10 ATRL, JEEP MTD | | |
| 10 MG, SP, LAND CRUISER MTD | | |
| 1 TANK, T-55 MDM | | |
| 111TH INFANTRY BATT | 394600N/1183120W | 500 |
| 7 AAMG, TRUCK, NFI | | |
| 2 APC, FIAT 6614 | | |
| 10 MORT, NFI | | |
| 15 TRK, LAND ROVER 4X4 | | |
| 6 ADA, 57MM, TWD, FLAP WHEEL ASSOC RDR | | |
| 112TH INFANTRY BATT | 400100N/1180430W | 400 |
| 5 AAMG, TRUCK, NFI | | |
| 1 APC, FIAT 6614 | | |
| 10 MORT, NFI | | |
| 10 TRK, LAND ROVER 4X4 | | |
| 3 ADA, 37MM, TWD, FLAP WHEEL ASSOC RDR | | |
| 113TH INFANTRY BATT | 400500N/1175000W | 300 |
| 5 AAMG, TRUCK, NFI | | |
| 1 APC, FIAT 6614 | | |
| 10 MORT, NFI | | |
| 5 TRK, LAND ROVER 4X4 | | |
| 1501ST ARTY COMPANY | 395800N/1181030W | 150 |
| 1 ADA, 23MM, SP, ZSU-23-4 | | |
| 1 APC, BTR-60P | | |
| 1 ARC, BRDM-2 VARIANT | | |
| 1 HOW, 122MM, TWD, D-30 | | |
| 2 TRK, 11 TON, MAGIRUS-DEUTZ | | |
| 2 TRK, CARGO, MEDIUM, NFI | | |
| 4 TRK, LAND ROVER 4X4 | | |
| 1 TRK, POL, NFI | | |

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| 1 TRK, VAN, NFI | | |
| 1 TRK, WTR, NFI | | |
| 12TH INFANTRY BRIGADE HQ | 392828N/1184639W | 200 |
| 10 ATRL, JEEP MTD | | |
| 10 MG, SP, LAND CRUISER MTD | | |
| 1 TANK, T-55 MDM | | |
| 121ST INFANTRY BATT | 394600N/1181030W | 500 |
| 7 AAMG, TRUCK, NFI | | |
| 2 APC, FIAT 6614 | | |
| 10 MORT, NFI | | |
| 15 TRK, LAND ROVER 4X4 | | |
| 6 ADA, 57MM, TWD, FLAP WHEEL ASSOC RDR | | |
| 122ND INFANTRY BATT | 393100N/1180200W | 400 |
| 5 AAMG, TRUCK, NFI | | |
| 1 APC, FIAT 6614 | | |
| 10 MORT, NFI | | |
| 10 TRK, LAND ROVER 4X4 | | |
| 3 ADA, 37MM, TWD, FLAP WHEEL ASSOC RDR | | |
| 123RD INFANTRY BATT | 394330N/1175300W | 300 |
| 5 AAMG, TRUCK, NFI | | |
| 1502ND ARTY COMPANY | 393500N/1181010W | 150 |
| 1 ADA, 23MM, SP, ZSU-23-4 | | |
| 1 APC, BTR-60P | | |
| 1 ARC, BRDM-2 VARIANT | | |
| 1 HOW, 122MM, TWD, D-30 | | |
| 2 TRK, 11 TON, MAGIRUS-DEUTZ | | |
| 2 TRK, CARGO, MEDIUM, NFI | | |
| 4 TRK, LAND ROVER 4X4 | | |
| 18 TANK, T-72, MDM, 125MM | | |
| 143RD MECH INF BATT | 395400N/1181230W | 400 |
| 2 ADA, 23MM, SP, ZSU-23-4 | | |
| 18 AIFV, BMP VARIANT | | |
| 4 TANK, T-72, MDM, 125MM | | |

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| 14TH MECH INF BRIGADE HQ | 392828N/1184639W | 200 |
| 2 PAC, BTR-60P | | |
| 3 TANK, T-55 | | |
| 141ST MECH INF BATT | 394130N/1181030W | 500 |
| 2 ADA, 23MM, SP, ZSU-23-4 | | |
| 6 ADA, 57MM, TWD, FLAP WHEEL ASSOC RDR | | |
| 18 AIFV, BMP VARIANT | | |
| 5 TANK, T-72, MDM, 125MM | | |
| 142ND MECH INF BATT | 394500N/1175830W | 300 |
| 2 ADA, 23MM, SP, ZSU-23-4 | | |
| 18 AIFV, BMP VARIANT | | |
| 4 TANK, T-72, MDM, 125MM | | |
| 133RD ARMOR BATT | 393100N/1180920W | 400 |
| 2 ADA, 23MM, SP, ZSU-23-4 | | |
| 4 AIFV, BMP VARIANT | | |
| 18 TANK, T-72, MDM, 125MM | | |
| 15TH ARTILLERY BRIGADE (IND) | 392600N/1184600W | 300 |
| 12 HOW, 152MM, SP, 2S3+2S3M AKATSIA | | |
| 3 ADA, 23MM, SP, ZSU-23-4 | | |
| 3 APC, BTR-60P | | |
| 3 ARC, BRDM-2 VARIANT | | |
| 2ND DIVISION (COMBINED) | 385520N/1175740W | 400 |
| 20 ATRL, JEEP MTD | | |
| 20 MG, SP, LAND CRUISER MTD | | |
| 21ST INFANTRY BRIGADE HQ | 385520N/1175740W | 200 |
| 10 ATRL, JEEP MTD | | |
| 10 MG, SP, LAND CRUISER MTD | | |
| 1 TANK, T-55 MDM | | |
| 211TH INFANTRY BATT | 392410N/1175230W | 500 |
| 7 AAMG, TRUCK, NFI | | |
| 2 APC, FIAT 6614 | | |

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| 10 MORT, NFI | | |
| 15 TRK, LAND ROVER 4X4 | | |
| 6 ADA, 57MM, TWD, FLAP WHEEL ASSOC RDR | | |
| 212TH INFANTRY BATT | 391630N/1180520W | 400 |
| 5 AAMG, TRUCK, NFI | | |
| 1 APC, FIAT 6614 | | |
| 10 MORT, NFI | | |
| 10 TRK, LAND ROVER 4X4 | | |
| 3 ADA, 37MM, TWD, FLAP WHEEL ASSOC RDR | | |
| 213TH INFANTRY BATT | 391345N/1182500W | 300 |
| 5 AAMG, TRUCK, NFI | | |
| 1 APC, FIAT 6614 | | |
| 10 MORT, NFI | | |
| 5 TRK, LAND ROVER 4X4 | | |
| 2501ST ARTY COMPANY | 391300N/1181245W | 150 |
| 1 ADA, 23MM, SP, ZSU-23-4 | | |
| 1 APC, BTR-60P | | |
| 1 ARC, BRDM-2 VARIANT | | |
| 1 HOW, 122MM, TWD, D-30 | | |
| 2 TRK, 11 TON, MAGIRUS-DEUTZ | | |
| 2 TRK, CARGO, MEDIUM, NFI | | |
| 4 TRK, LAND ROVER 4X4 | | |
| 1 TRK, POL, NFI | | |
| 1 TRK, VAN, NFI | | |
| 1 TRK, WTR, NFI | | |
| 22ND INFANTRY BRIGADE HQ | 385520N/1175740W | 200 |
| 10 ATRL, JEEP MTD | | |
| 10 MG, SP, LAND CRUISER MTD | | |
| 1 TANK, T-55 MDM | | |
| 221ST INFANTRY BATT | 391900N/1171630W | 500 |
| 7 AAMG, TRUCK, NFI | | |
| 2 APC, FIAT 6614 | | |
| 10 MORT, NFI | | |

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| 15 | TRK, LAND ROVER 4X4 | | |
| 6 | ADA, 57MM, TWD, FLAP WHEEL ASSOC RDR | | |
| 222ND | INFANTRY BATT | 390350N/1174200W | 400 |
| 5 | AAMG, TRUCK, NFI | | |
| 1 | APC, FIAT 6614 | | |
| 10 | MORT, NFI | | |
| 10 | TRK, LAND ROVER 4X4 | | |
| 3 | ADA, 37MM, TWD, FLAP WHEEL ASSOC RDR | | |
| 223RD | INFANTRY BATT | 385530N/1181400W | 300 |
| 5 | AAMG, TRUCK, NFI | | |
| 1 | APC, FIAT 6614 | | |
| 10 | MORT, NFI | | |
| 5 | TRK, LAND ROVER 4X4 | | |
| 2502ND | ARTY COMPANY | 390130N/1174030W | 150 |
| 1 | ADA, 23MM, SP, ZSU-23-4 | | |
| 1 | APC, BTR-60P | | |
| 1 | ARC, BRDM-2 VARIANT | | |
| 1 | HOW, 122MM, TWD, D-30 | | |
| 2 | TRK, 11 TON, MAGIRUS-DEUTZ | | |
| 2 | TRK, CARGO, MEDIUM, NFI | | |
| 4 | TRK, LAND ROVER 4X4 | | |
| 1 | TRK, POL, NFI | | |
| 1 | TRK, VAN, NFI | | |
| 1 | TRK, WTR, NFI | | |
| 23RD | ARMOR BRIGADE HQ | 385520N/1175740W | 200 |
| 2 | APC, BTR-60P | | |
| 3 | TANK, T-72, MDM, 125MM | | |
| 231ST | ARMOR BATT | 390150N/1175900W | 400 |
| 2 | ADA, 23MM, SP, ZSU-23-4 | | |
| 5 | AIFV, BMP VARIANT | | |
| 18 | TANK, T-72, MDM, 125MM | | |
| 232ND | ARMOR BATT | 391910N/1181130W | 400 |
| 2 | ADA, 23MM, SP, ZSU-23-4 | | |
| 4 | AIFV, BMP VARIANT | | |

18 TANK, T-72, MDM, 125MM
 243RD MECH INF BATT 392300N/1171520W 400
 2 ADA, 23MM, SP, ZSU-23-4
 18 AIFV, BMP VARIANT
 4 TANK, T-72, MDM, 125MM
 24TH MECH INF BRIGADE HQ 385520N/1175740W 200
 2 PAC, BTR-60P
 3 TANK, T-55
 241ST MECH INF BATT 385920N/1182100W 500
 2 ADA, 23MM, SP, ZSU-23-4
 6 ADA, 57MM, TWD, FLAP WHEEL ASSOC RDR
 18 AIFV, BMP VARIANT
 5 TANK, T-72, MDM, 125MM
 242ND MECH INF BATT 391920N/1175500W 300
 2 ADA, 23MM, SP, ZSU-23-4
 18 AIFV, BMP VARIANT
 4 TANK, T-72, MDM, 125MM
 233RD ARMOR BATT 391620N/1172700W 400
 2 ADA, 23MM, SP, ZSU-23-4
 4 AIFV, BMP VARIANT
 18 TANK, T-72, MDM, 125MM
 25TH ARTILLERY BRIGADE (IND) 385400N/1180000W 300
 12 HOW, 152MM, SP, 2S3+2S3M AKATSIA
 3 ADA, 23MM, SP, ZSU-23-4
 3 APC, BTR-60P
 3 ARC, BRDM-2 VARIANT

12. (U) NAVAL FORCES:

A. (U) ORANGE NAVAL FORCES ARE LIMITED IN BOTH SCALE AND EMPLOYMENT. NOB AT AUSTIN NAVAL FACILITY (392823N/1171203W) INCLUDES 2 OSA I PTG AND 2 OSA II PTG WITH EMPLOYMENT CONSISTING OF 1-2 DAYTIME PATROLS IN LINE OF SITE OF THE COASTLINE. NIGHTTIME PATROLS HAVE NOT BEEN OBSERVED. ORANGE NAVAL FORCES HAVE NOT BEEN OBSERVED PARTICIPATING IN THE AIR DEFENSE NETWORK, BUT MAY PROVIDE LIMITED TATTLETALE INFORMATION.

13. (U) WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION:

A. (U) ORANGE IS CONDUCTING BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL RESEARCH, AND HAS SWOWN A WILLINGNESS IN THE PAST TO EXPERIMENT ON ITS OWN

CITIZENS USING RUDIMENTARY DELIVERY METHODS (TRUCK PESTICIDE SPRAYERS). ALTHOUGH NOT ASSESSED NOT TO BE OPERATIONAL, ORANGE IS ACTIVELY PERSUING C/B ARTILLERY, TACAIR DELIVERED AND TBM CAPABILITY. ORANGE'S CAPABILITIES SHOULD NOT BE OVERLOOKED BECAUSE OF THEIR DETERMINATION TO OVERCOME AT ALL COSTS. PROFESSOR JOSH'HA HANDIA IS CURRENTLY IN CHARGE OF THE CHEMICAL PROGRAM AND IS KNOWN TO BE A SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

14. (U) PARAMILITARY FORCES:

A. (U) ORANGE HAS A VERY LARGE NATIONAL POLICE FORCE, CONSISTING OF OVER 40,000 PERSONNEL AND IS SUBORDINATE TO THE MINISTER OF INTERNAL SECURITY. IT IS ORGANIZED AND EQUIPPED ALONG MILITARY LINES, WITH STANDARD INFANTRY WEAPONS, INCLUDING LIGHT AND HEAVY MACHINE GUNS. MANY UNITS ARE ALSO EQUIPPED WITH LIGHTLY ARMORED VEHICLES. IN ADDITION TO A STRONG PRESENCE IN THE URBAN AREAS, ORANGE NATIONAL POLICE PERSONNEL ARE SPREAD WIDELY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRYSIDE, GENERALLY IN SMALL 15-45 MAN POLICE POSTS. WHILE NOT DIRECTLY SUBORDINATE TO THE ARMED FORCES, THE POLICE CAN BE UTILIZED TO AUGMENT THE MILITARY AS LIGHT INFANTRY.

15. (U) CSAR:

A. (U) SPECIFIC PROCEDURES ARE OUTLINED IN THEATER CSAR SPINS (ISSUED VIA SEPCOR).

B. (U) SAFE AREA DESCRIPTION. SAFE AREA 007-8 IS LOCATED IN THE NORTHEASTERN PART OF ORANGE, 5 KM SOUTHEAST OF AN ABANDONED AIRSTRIP, AND IS CENTERED ON 393300N/1180130W. SEE REF A FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

DECL/OADR//

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